Capitalization Tables Demystified

Guest post by Kevin Learned and Denise Dunlap, Boise Angel Alliance

Originally post on Angel Insights Blog, The Angel Capital Association

Terms like “warrants, waterfalls and preferences” can be confusing and intimidating when attempting to understand a capitalization table (aka cap table); it is no wonder we are often asked for a simple way to understand them! This article will give a brief overview of why cap tables are important and introduce a simple model to use early in the due diligence process.

As fund administrators and instructors for the Angel Capital Association (ACA)’s educational programs,  Loon Creek founders Kevin and Denise sometimes develop tools to help investors understand the concepts presented in the courses they teach. Many years ago Kevin developed a simple spreadsheet to model basic cap tables for use by our local angels as part of their regular due diligence process. He introduced this model during his presentation at a recent national webinar for the ACA discussing the basics of cap tables. You can download a copy of that cap table model as well as access the webinar archive from our Resources page.  

For those who would like a brief primer, a capitalization table is a document that lists all of the owners of equity and potential equity, the shares they own and the percentage ownership those shares represent.  Typically, the cap table is organized by type of security and/or by investment round.

We believe it is important for angel investors to understand cap tables.  It is part of our regular diligence process to first construct our own summary cap table before we decide to invest.  

Here’s what a rudimentary cap table can help you answer:

  • Founders’ ownership. What percentage of the company do the founders own now and will be likely to own at exit?  As investors, we want to be sure the founders have adequate incentive to continue to work very hard right through the exit.
  • Stock options. How many shares are set aside for the stock option pool, and is the pool set up before or after we make our investment (pre or post money)?  We know the company will not be able to pay market salaries in its early years and that a stock option pool will be needed to attract quality staff.  If the pool is set up before we invest, then the dilution associated with the stock option pool goes against the previous investors; if the pool is set up after our investment, then we are diluted as well at the time we make our investment.
  • Valuation. What is the impact of the agreed upon pre-money valuation?  This allows us to see what percentage of the company we will own now as well as projecting that through to exit to see if a) an exit at the required valuation is achievable, b) the likely exit will be sufficiently rewarding.
  • Subsequent rounds. What is the impact of subsequent investment rounds in terms of dilution, share price, and required exit valuation?
  • Exits. At various exit amounts what will our return likely be?

We have also found this simple model to be a helpful tool when working with entrepreneurs who are new to the process – often cap tables are confusing to them as well! In our experience, many entrepreneurs rely on a third party such as an attorney to maintain the schedule for them and only understand it at a high level.

Admittedly cap tables can become very complicated when they take into account convertible notes, warrants, preferences, waterfalls and other terms and instruments that may impact our return.  But we argue that if the simple cap table doesn’t show you that it is possible for this investment to make stellar returns, then you need go no further with negotiations or due diligence.

The ACA has a wonderful advanced course on cap tables that teaches the audience to deal with the myriad of possible return-reducing conditions.  Information on this and other ACA courses is available from their website.  

Opportunity and Risk Reduction: The Startup Two-Step

Guest post by Paul A. Jones, Of Counsel, Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Most entrepreneurs really enjoy talking about the prodigious opportunity at the end of their startup’s rainbow. The reward side of the high-risk/reward equation. And that’s good, to a point. The point at which the prospective investor buys into the reality of the opportunity and the entrepreneur’s team for capturing it. Unfortunately, it’s not a point at which most prospective investors are willing to write a check.

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Silicon Valley Venture Capital Survey – Fourth Quarter 2017

 

By Cynthia Clarfield Hess, Mark A. Leahy and Khang Tran

View the full report.

Background
This report analyzes the terms of 190 venture financings closed in the fourth quarter of 2017 by companies headquartered in Silicon Valley.

Overview of Results
Valuation Results Remain Strong
Valuation results continued to be strong in Q4 2017, but the percentage price increases declined moderately compared to the prior quarter, following three consecutive quarters of increases.

Internet/Digital Media Scores Highest Valuation Results
The internet/digital media industry recorded the strongest valuation results in Q4 2017 compared to the other industries, with an average price increase of 179% and a median price increase of 51%, both up from the prior quarter.

Valuation Results Down for Series D Financings
Series D financings recorded the weakest valuation results in Q4 2017 compared to the other financing rounds, with the highest percentage of down rounds and the lowest average and median price increases of all the financing rounds.

 

FULL REPORT

 

View the original post by Fenwick & West LLP

Venture Capital Fundamentals: Three Basic Rules-Dilution, Dilution, Dilution

Written by: Joseph W. Bartlett, VC Experts Founder

Take a sample of 100 venture-backed companies successful enough to undertake an initial public offering. In a high percentage of the transactions, the prospectus discloses that the earliest stage investors (founders and angels) wind up with close to trivial equity percentages and thus, puny returns on their investment in the company. One would think that these investors are entitled to the lushest rewards because of the high degree of risk accompanying their early stage investments, cash and/or sweat. The problem, however, is dilution. Most early stage companies go through multiple rounds of private financing, and one or more of those rounds is often a “down round,” which entails a disappointing price per share and, therefore, significant dilution to those shareholders who are not in a position to play in the later rounds.

The problem of dilution is serious because it has a dampening impact on angels and others who are thinking of financing, joining or otherwise contributing to a start up. Estimates put the relationship of angel capital to early stageinvestments by professional VCs at five dollars of angel capital going into promising start ups for every one dollar of VC investment. But if angels are increasingly discouraged by the threat of dilution, particularly since the meltdown, we don’t have much of an industry; there is no one to start the engines. [1]

There are a variety of fixes for the dilution issue open to founders and angels.

  • Make sure you enjoy pre-emptive rights, the ability to participate in any and all future rounds of financing and to protect your percentage interest. Pre-emptive rights can be, of course, lost if you don’t have the money as founders and angels often do not to play in subsequent rounds.
  • Try to get a negative covenant; this gives you a veto over the subsequent round and particularly the pricing of the terms.

You don’t want to kill the goose of course, meaning veto a dilutive round and then once the Company fails for lack of cash; however, a veto right at least will you the opportunity to make sure the round is fairly prices; that the board casts a wide enough net so that the round is not an inside trade; meaning that the investors in control of the Company, go over in the corner and do a deal with themselves. Those rounds can be highly toxic to the existing shareholders (cram downs, as they are called). Finally, if you don’t have cash try to upgrade your percentage interest with derivative securitiesoptions and warrants (a warrant is another word for option, they are the same security, a call on the Company’s stock at a fixed price but options are if the call was labeled if an employee is the beneficiary is the holder and the warrants are for everyone else). If you are the founding entrepreneur therefore, make sure you are a participant in the employee option program. Often the founder will start off with a sufficient significant percentage of the Company’s equity that she doesn’t feel necessary to declare herself eligible for employee options. This is a major mistake. In fact, I am likely to suggest founder client consider a piece of financial engineering I claim to have invented; the issuance of warrants in favor of the founders and angels at significant step-ups from the current valuation, which I call ‘up-the-ladder warrants.’ To see how the structure works, consider the following example:

Let’s say the angels are investing $1,000,000 in 100,000 shares ($10 per share) at a pre-money valuation of $3 million, resulting in a post money valuation of $4 million ($1 million going into the Company). We suggest angels also obtain 100 percent warrant coverage, meaning they can acquire three warrants, totaling calls on another 100,000 shares of the Company’s stock; however not to scare off subsequent venture capitalists or, more importantly, cause the VCs to require the warrants be eliminated as a price for future investments. The exercise prices of the warrants will be based on pre-money valuations which are relatively heroic win/win valuations, if you like. For the sake of argument, the exercise prices could be set at $30, $40 and $50 a share (33,333 shares in each case).

Let’s use a hypothetical example to see how this regime could work. Since the angels have invested $1 million at a post-money valuation of $4 million, they therefore own 25 percent of the Company–100,000 shares out of a total of 400,000 outstanding. The three warrants, as stated, are each a call on 33,333 shares. Subsequent down rounds raise $2,000,000 and dilute the angels’ share of the Company’s equity from 25 percent to, say, 5 percent–their 100,000 shares now represent 5 percent of 2,000,000 shares (cost basis still $10 per share) and the down round investors own 1,900,000 shares at a cost of $1.05 per share. Assume only one down round. Finally, assume the Company climbs out of the cellar and is sold for $100 million in cash, or $50 per share.

Absent ‘up-the-ladder warrants,’ the proceeds to the angels would be $5 million–not a bad return (5x) on their investment but, nonetheless, arguably inconsistent with the fact that the angels took the earliest risk. The ‘up-the-ladder warrants‘ add to the angels’ ultimate outcome (and we assume cashless exercise or an SAR technique, and ignore the effect of taxes) as follows: 33,333 warrants at $20/share are in the money by $666,660 and 33,333 warrants at $10 a share are in the money by $333,330. While the number of shares to be sold rises to 2,066,666, let’s say, for sake of simplicity, the buy-out price per share remains at $50, meaning the angels get another $999,999–call it $1 million. The angels’ total gross returns have increased 20 percent while the VCs’ returns have stayed at $95,000,000. Even if the $1,000,000 to the angels comes out of the VC’s share, that’s trivial slippage … a gross payback of 47.5 times their investment, vs. 47 times. If the company sells for just $30 a share, the angels get nothing and the VCs still make out.


 

IVC-APM Most Active Venture Capital Funds in Israel – 2017

Guest Post by: IVC Research Center

»  Israeli VC’s activity grows with 212 first investments – 48% of the total – a 5-year record
»  Number of early stage rounds (seed + A rounds) dropped 14% in 2017 compared to 2016

»  An increase of 22% in the number of first investments in B rounds in 2017 compared to 2016

Vertex Israel ranked at the top of the 2017 list with 12 first investments. aMoon Partners, a life sciences fund managed by Check Point founder Marius Nacht, ranked second, performing 11 new investments from its $150 million fund. Three funds shared third place – F2 Capital, iAngels Seed Fund and Mindset Ventures with ten new investments each…Read more

The report contains analyses based on the IVC Most Active Investors Dashboard, an IVC Industry Analyticsbusiness intelligence product, containing detailed information on active VC and other investors via an interactive, user-friendly interface.

The Top 20 Most Active Investors Dashboard and Most Active Investors Visual Dashboard are available online to IVC Industry Analytics subscribers only and present a wealth of continually updated investor data, which can be filtered according to year, type of investor, type of investment and more.

Previous Reports

   » See 2016 Most Active Funds – Press Release

» See 2015 Most Active Funds – Press Release

   » See 2014 Most Active Funds – Press Release

» See 2013 Most Active Funds – Press Release

» See 2012 Most Active Funds – Press Release

After a Down Round: Alternatives for Employee Incentive Plans

*Excerpted from VC Experts Encyclopedia of Private Equity & Venture Capital


Employee Incentive Plans for Privately-Held Companies

Despite the recent improvement in capital markets activity, many small, privately-held technology companies continue to face reduced valuations and highly dilutive financings, frequently referred to as “down rounds.” These financings can create difficulties for retention of management and other key employees who were attracted to the company in large part for the potential upside of the option or stock ownership program. When down rounds are implemented, the investors can acquire a significant percentage of the company at valuations that are lower than the valuations used for prior financing rounds. Lower valuations mean lower preferred stock values for the preferred stock issued in the down round, and as preferred stock values drop significantly, common stock values also drop, including the value of common stock options held by employees.

Consequently, reduced valuations and “down round” financings frequently cause two results: (i) substantial dilution of the common stock ownership of the company and (ii) the devaluation of the common stock, particularly in view of the increased aggregate liquidation preference of the preferred stock that comes before the common stock. The result is a company with an increasingly larger percentage being held by the holders of the preferred stock and with common stock that can be relatively worthless and unlikely to see any proceeds in the event of an acquisition in the foreseeable future.

In the face of substantial dilution of the common stock and significant devaluation in equity value, companies are faced with the difficulty of retaining key personnel and offering meaningful equity incentives. Potential solutions can be very simple (issuing additional options to counteract dilution) or quite complex (issuing a new class of stock with rights tailored to balance the concerns of both investors and employees). Intermediate solutions range from effecting a recapitalization that will result in an increase in the value of the common stock to implementing a cash bonus plan for employees that is to be paid in the event of an acquisition. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, and each may be appropriate depending on the circumstances of a particular company, but the more complex alternatives can offer companies greater flexibility to satisfy the competing demands of employees and investors. This article briefly reviews three of the solutions that can be implemented-the use of additional optionsrecapitalizationsand retention plans (cash and equity based).

Granting Additional Options

The simplest solution to address the dilution of common stock is to issue additional employee stock options. For example, assume that, prior to a down round, a company had 9,000,000 shares of common and preferred stockoutstanding and the employees held options to purchase an additional 1,000,000 shares. Also assume that, in the down round, the company issued additional preferred stock that is convertible into 10,000,000 shares of common stock. On a fully-diluted basis (i.e., taking into account all options and the conversion of all preferred stock), the employees have seen the value of their options reduced from 10% of the company to 5%, or by 50%. In this case, the company might issue the employees additional options to increase their ownership percentage. It would require additional options to purchase in excess of 1,000,000 shares to return the employees to a 10% ownership position, although a smaller amount would still reduce the impact of the down round and might be enough to help entice the employees to stay.

If the common stock retains significant value, the grant of additional options can be an effective solution. It is also relatively straightforward to implement; at most, stockholder approval may be required for an increase in the optionpool. In many cases, however, the aggregate liquidation preference of the preferred stock is unlikely to leave anything for the common holders following an acquisition, particularly in the short term. In that event, the dilution of the common stock becomes less relevant – 5% of nothing is the same as 10% of nothing. Companies with this kind of common stock devaluation will need to consider more intricate solutions.

Recapitalizations

If the common stock has been effectively reduced to minimal value by the down round, a company could increase the common stock value through a recapitalization. A recapitalization can be implemented through a decrease in the liquidation preferences of the preferred stock or a conversion of some preferred stock into common stock, thereby increasing the share of the proceeds that is distributed to the common stock upon a sale of the company. This solution is conceptually straightforward and certainly effective in increasing the value of the common stock. In most cases with privately-held venture capital backed companies, however, the holders of the preferred stock are the investors who typically fund and implement the down rounds and in nearly all cases the preferred stockholders have a veto right over any recapitalization. Accordingly, implementing a recapitalization would require the consent of the affected preferred stockholders, which may be difficult to obtain, particularly because the preferred stockholders may not like the permanency of this approach. In addition, a recapitalization can be quite complicated in practice, raising significant legal, tax and accounting issues.

Retention Plans

Another approach is the implementation of a retention plan. Such plans can take a number of forms and can use cash or a new class of equity with rights designed to satisfy the interests of both the investors and employees. These solutions are more complicated, but also more flexible.

Cash Bonus Plan

In a cash bonus plan, the company guarantees a certain amount of money to employees in the event of an acquisition. This amount can equal a fixed sum or a percentage of the net sale proceeds, to be allocated among the employees at the time of the sale, or it can be a fixed amount per employee, determined in advance. Allocations can be based on a wide variety of parameters, enabling a high degree of flexibility. Often these plans have a limited duration (such as 12 to 24 months, or until the company raises a specified amount of additional equity).

A cash bonus plan is easy to understand, provides the employees with cash to pay any taxes that may be due and can be flexible if the allocations are not determined in advance. However, there are a number of hurdles. Many acquisitions are structured as stock-for-stock exchanges (i.e., the acquiring company issues stock as payment for the stock of the target company) because such exchanges may be eligible for tax-free treatment. A cash bonus plan may interfere with the tax-free treatment and, thus, may reduce the value of the company in the sale or may be a barrier to the transaction altogether.

A cash bonus plan can also be problematic in that it requires cash from a potential acquirer in the event there isn’t sufficient cash on hand in the target company. A mandatory cash commitment from an acquiror may also make the company less attractive as a target. Typically, a cash bonus plan can be adopted (and amended and terminated prior to an acquisition) by the board of directors, although a cash bonus plan creates an interest that may in effect be senior to the preferred stock, which requires consideration as to whether the consent of the preferred holders is required.

New Class of Equity

A stock bonus or option plan utilizing a new class of equity, although more complicated, shares many of the benefits of the cash bonus plan, but avoids some of the major disadvantages. A newly created class of equity, such as senior common stock or an employee series of preferred stock, permits the use of various combinations of rights. The new class of equity can be entitled to a fixed dollar amount, a portion of the purchase price or both. These rights can be in preference to, participating with or subordinate to any preferred holders, and the shares may be convertible into ordinary common stock at the option of the holders or upon the occurrence of certain events. Referring to our earlier example, the company might return the employees to their pre-down round position by issuing them senior common stock entitled to 10% of the consideration (up to a certain amount) in any sale of the company. Although a return of the employees to their pre-down round position may not be acceptable to the preferred stockholders and may not be necessary to keep the employees incentivized, the new class of equity can be tailored to fit whatever balance is acceptable to the investors.

This type of approach has several advantages. First, unlike a simple issuance of additional options, it gives real value to employees that were affected by a devaluation of their common stock. Second, unlike a cash bonus plan, it does not require an acquiror to put up cash when they purchase the company and the acquirer is less likely to discount the purchase price. Third, unlike a cash bonus plan, it will not affect the tax-free nature of many stock-for-stock acquisitions. Finally, it provides certainty to the participants, who know exactly what they will be entitled to receive upon a sale of the company.

The main disadvantage of creating a new class of equity, at least from the employees’ standpoint, is that the employee will either have to pay fair market value for the stock when it is issued or recognize a tax liability upon such issuance, when they may not have the cash with which to pay the taxes. This disadvantage can be partially ameliorated by the use of options for the new class of equity, rather than issuing the new equity up front, which at least allows the employee to control the timing of the tax liability by deciding when to exercise. Moreover, for many employees an option may qualify as an incentive stock option under federal tax law, thus allowing the employee to defer taxation until the sale of the underlying stock. A new class of equity will also be somewhat more difficult for most employees to understand, at least when compared to traditional common stock options.

In addition, a new class of equity adds complexity from the company’s perspective. It may raise securities and accounting issues, and shareholder approval of an amendment to the company’s charter will be required. At a minimum, it will require more elaborate documentation than some of the simpler alternatives, such as a cash bonus plan, and thus it will likely be more expensive to implement at a time when the company may be particularly sensitive to preserving its cash. A new class of equity may also result in future complications such as separate class votes or effective veto rights in certain circumstances. As with the other solutions that address the devaluation problem, there may be resistance from the existing preferred holders, whose share of the consideration upon a sale of the company would thereby be reduced.

These complexities are surmountable and companies may find that they are more than balanced by the advantages that a new class of equity provides over other solutions in addressing issues of reduced common stock valuations and dilution.